W
e all know what trust is. We consider trust to play a part in our close relationships, between our friends and loved ODes and us. Trust is a ubiquitous element of our everyday life; it is referred to in advertise ments, in politics, and in economical contexts. We trust (or do not trust) in God, in the harmlessness of beef, or in the new market (see fig. I ). Despite this seem ing self-evidence, however, trust sparks intense scholarly interest. Its nature and function have been the subject of theoretical and practical analysis in sociology, theology, and philosophy since the beginning of the twentieth century. Interest grew even livelier in the second half of the last century. Challcnges such as recent experiences with totalitarian regimes, with intellectual movements like existentialism' and an increasing interest in psychology and socioiogy,2 pro voked debates. The massive scholarly literature produced on trust since the 1970s and 1980s until the present is as manifold and diverse as are the different interests of moral philosophers, psychotherapists and economic strategists.)
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J I am not aware of any general bibliograpby on trust The basic make-up of the vast field as well as bibliographical surveys are provided, however, by the increasing number of entries in had already started to do precisely what Frevert reconunended and may take the credit for being the first to have worked with Luhmann 's theory of trust in historical analysis.7
The significance of trust as a crucial category of everyday life, and also of an expanding field of investigation in the social and economic sciences, is evi dent. Therefore, there is no need to establish the reasons for the historians' interest in trust. Since they are only just starting to work with the theories, however, some methodological experiments and reflections may be helpful. In some way the late start of the historians may even have its advantages. Since they have not taken part in the debates, theirs could be the detached position of the observer, which might allow for some criticism, and also for some new insights.
H.
Medievalists observe two important deficiencies in the current debates on trust. First, social scientists measure the quantity of trust and analyze why and how trust emerges or disappears. Their results are used to generate political, psychological and economical strategies. These techniques are considered methodologically adequate, because trust is held to be a phenomenon inherent in human nature, which only needs the right conditions and care to blossom.
From this perspective, trust is seen as a scarce natuial resource.8 Problems arise, however, when historians wish to employ trust as a histori cal category that is independent of the semantic changes of the various histori cal terms. Trust slips through our hands amorpbously as we try to get hold of its exact meaning, and to d.istinguish it from related ideas and the terms employed to talk about them. We discover that these difficulties are not solved on the level of scientific literature: there are in fact great differences within and be tween the psychoanalytical, philosophical, theological, sociological and sodo psychological definitions of trust. Simultaneously, ftmdamental distinctions On the other hand, there are existing discourses in political strategies of the twentieth century, especially in authoritarian and dictatorial contexts, which could be disqualified as not being discourses about trust -which they positively are -but discourses about slavish obedience, naive loyalty, authoritarian power, and unscrupulous manipulation -which they also are. That is to say, historical discourses about trust, e.g. in the Soviet Union or in the Gennan Empire during Can something on which so little consensus is possible, which is thought to exist in contexts as different as those between FiIhrer and people, between individual businessman and global management, or between mother and infant, be a natural phenomenon 'as such' at all? On the contrary, the seeming identity between quite different phenomena is obviously the result of using the same tenn for them. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that ever more hybrid tenns are now needed to distinguish between matters which are indeed felt to be different phenomena, like Freundschaftsvertrauen ('trust in friendship'), Systemvertrauen ('trust in systems'), Urvertrauen ('basic trust'), etc. It is true that the sociology of trust points towards a very important social phenomenon: people rely on each other. But the reality of the disputes about the nature of trust, and the reality of the differences between specific forms of relying on one another, disguised by the use of identical labels, support the hypothesis that trust is culturally and specifically constructed. Today -and this is an intriguing historical fact in itself-there even exist ideas of trust which are the exclusive product of scientifi c debates. 17 Consequentl�, trust is an object of historical transfonnation. Just as it is the custom to distinguish between fides in the Roman Empire and fides in the Germanic featty, without assuming the existence of something like fides as such, trust as such does not exist.
III.
Trust, as we have seen, is commonly thought of as an unhistorical element of social life. It may have been labelled with different tenus, but it remained the same. While this assumption was never historically reviewed, let alone histori cally proven, the present discourse of trust is also closely linked with concep tions of hi story, and especially with those of modem history.
Cases in point are the theories of trust ofGeorg Sirhmell8 and Niklas Luh mann.l!J They agree that trust has become an important social factor only in modern societies. Simmel said that trust, was.necessary because of a lack of knowledge. He suggested that in modem societies knowledge about other pe0-ple was decreasing, because he experienced modem societies to be too complex and too liberal, while people were too individual to know everything about e�h other. An individual represents many personalities in the different situa tions and societies he or she finds himself or herself in; the inner' intentions, however, remain hidden fr om view. Here, trust is deeply attached to the modem idea of individuality and the limits of communication.
Niklas Luhmann constructed his theory of trust from similar assumptions.
He observed that over-complexity does not prevent psychologically stable people fr om coping with the danger of using a car, or from cooperating with strangers, because the individual understands that he or she does not need to control, to understand, to foresee everything. Individuals delegate functions.
17 See above, notes 11-13.
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Their lack of knowledge is bridged by trust and in this way complexity is re duced. Through cooperation individuals multiply their own potentials and by that increase complexity again. Luhmann imagined our modem economical and social societies with their interdependent institutions as skyscrapers constructed on skeletons of trust. How accurately his metaphor describes the mechanism of the globalized world became apparent when two real skyscrapers collapsed in
200l.
While Simmel and Luhmann's analyses of their own time produce fruitful insights, they combined their theories with pseudo-historical theories about past, so-called 'traditional' societies. These theories were pseudo-historical in natur e because they were constructed without empirical data. Traditional societ ies were a simple antitype ofSimmel and Lubmann 's idea of the modem world.
Intimacy and familiarity were seen as their main characteristics. In traditional societies, people relied on each other as a matter of course. There were no indi viduals, no complexity, no unknown future, therefore no secrets, no risks and no trust. Luhmann's argumentation suggests that his 'traditional society' is to be understood as the 'precartesian society',2O Le., probably, the Middle Ages.
Here the medievalists' reviewing of the theories and pragmatic analysis could start. AB Petra Schulte has shown, trust can be seen to operate, in ways analogical to those of Luhmann 's world, in the Italian communal life of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.21 It is true that, in commerce and on journeys, mistrust was often the order of the day. But sil).ce it was impossible to control, to know, and to understand everything, and since there was the need to reduce over-complexity in medieval worlds, too, people were in fact relying on one another, be it on the validi ty of their acts and charters, the quality of unfamiliar money, the expertise of priests and scholars, the loyalty of subordinates or friends, the correct transmission of money from Europe to the Holy Land or the experience of the seafarer. There were also different ways of managing the risk involved in relying on somebody else, whether in personal, political or reli gious relations. This is why there are so many historical studies about social conflict and social cohesion which could be reread fruitfull y fr om the perspec tive oftrust.22 But should they perhaps not only be reread but also be rewritten?
;to Ll)HMANN , Vertrauen, p. 21. 21 SCHuL TE, "�ripturae publicae creditur". And certainly an increase of cultural knowledge and a levelling of cultural differences is as much part of tbe modem world as is the highly idealized con ception of individuality.
IV.
The title of an early modem travel story shows that changes both in trust as a term for a specific idea as well as in the different forms of understanding relationship and reliance are probable, even during the modem era: Cambridge, 1996) . These (mainly psychological and modernist)
Iheorems, which originatcd in a discourse about trust in educational theories (SUDDE, "Familienvertrauen", pp. 155-161) are not congruent with Luhtnann 's theories. because they equate familiarity and trust. Luhmann, however. stresses the difference between these two con cepts and saw trust as the more reflected and elaborate fonn of reliancc (LuHMANN , Yertrauen, A history of the term 'trust' has not been written as yet. Apparently, the English etymology still poses problems. They cannot be solved in the present paper.27 But it is clear that 'trust' and Vertrauen have the same roots. Together with a bundle of other terms, they probably origin from the Indo-EW'Opean roo t *deru-('oak' or 'tree'), which meant 'strong', 'solid like a tree'. To this family also belongs Middle High Gennan /rUunge, which since the sixteenth century is a term for marriage. 'To trust', in German vertrauen, is related to trauen, which means both 'to trust' and 'to marry'. It is also related to Old English and German Trost, which originally meant 'to become solid'.18 In modem German, Trost is simply a synonym for 'consolation' and 'comfort', while it is' appar ently no longer in use in English.29 Accordingly. Middle High German missetriuwe is not simply a term for 'mistrust', but also includes the semantic field of 'not solid'. ' to be desolate', 'to be in despair' ,30 15 1. STRUYS, tr. J. MOAAlSON (London, 1683). Then: have been several editions. 26 See supra, n. 13.
The Old Gennan synonyms for vertrauen are not confmed to the terms just mentioned. Verlrauen apparently is based on semantic change and confluence of a great variety of tenns: Fidunge, gedranc, getriuwe, getriuwunge, getniwen, hof f enunge. gewinnen.J' Several of these terms are semantically related to the binding for mal contract, duty, law, and the coniuralio. In this sense, they greatly differ from sociological defmitions of trust, which are characterized by infonnaiity.
Again, the meaning 'to marry' is found in the sample.
Matthias Lexer wrote bis renowned dictionary of Middle High Gennan in the second half of the nineteenth century. Reading his entries on trust, it be comes apparent that his semantic understanding of vertrauen is neither congru ent with contemporary Gennan nor with the sociological defmitions.12 Even within the last 130 years important changes in the semantic field took place."
Lexer saw vertrauen as a tenn for making a contract or taking an oath. He also felt that vertrauen means 'to entrust'. While 'entrust' is semantically dominant in English 'trust' ('trustee'), this semantic field is no longer included in present Gennan vertrauen. origins, these terms are semantically very similar. They are much closer related to one another than to 'trust'. One important semantic feature they share is that they all are synonyms for 'religious belief'. Apparently there are ideas which link medieval Europe with the Near East, and separate them from the modem discourses for reasons which might be an object of historical research.
'Religious belief subsumed the meaning 'to abide by a specific (religious, ethical, political) law'. 'Belief' is also closely related to 'faithfulness'. In this sense, all these tenns are also related to 'truth', as abiding by the law is seen as 'doing the truth'. The Semitic terms even share the same root with their respec tive tenns for 'truth'. These different aspects are mirrored by the words which are used to translatefides into Gennan. When the iate-eighth-century translator of the seventh-century De jide catholica contra [udeos by Isidore of Sevilla (c. 570-636) translated the wordjides, he used triuuua, which is 'faithfulness', chilaubin, which is 'belief', and chilaupnissa, which is 'confession', doctrina jidei.)Ci
Terms which do not have the same prominent religious connotations are of coune conjido, conjidentia and fiducia. But these terms are no synonyms of 'trust' in the modem sense either. Fiducia includes a wide semantic field to which belong 'courage' and 'strength'. Philological research has also shown that these terms are rather ambivalent, different from fides, which is almost exclusively seen as a positive category. They can also mean 'audacity', even 'hubris' .31 And they are no basic categories for interpersonal relations asjides had been18 or trust has become.
v.
Bible translations fonn a very useful corpus of sources, which has been intensely investigated by philologists. They connect the ancient and the modem world and supply us with materials which can be followed up into other genres. Surprisingly and significantly, however, 'trust' as a biblical term has not elic ited much interest so far, neither from philological nor from theological schol arship. The reason is obvious: in the Bible, 'trust' is neither important, nor 16 H. EoGERS, Vollstiindiges lateinisch-althochdeutsches W4rlerbuch zur oltlwchdeutschen Isidor-Obn-setzung (Berlin, 1960) .
tically. It also seems to have included gehoffen and gedingen, i.e. 'to hope' and 'to be committed to somebody' respectively. Luther also uses vertrawen in the sense of 'to marry', 'to engage', as the semantic field of the word had been in Middle High German.4� But Vertrawen in his understanding can also mean 'obligation', 'duty', and even 'power of one person over another': ..... Id 'iin 6!!l ba'alu ba!em ... " or "quia ego vir vester', as the Lord says in ler 3, 14, is trans lated by Luther as ..... ich wil euch mir vertrawen .. . tt. In this passage, for once we understand that Luther has in mind something that is essentially different from our understanding of 'trust'. Although phonetically virtually identical, the sense of vertrauen has radically changed. This is why in the modernised trans lation vertrawen in this passage has been substituted. Instead we fmd ... . . denn ich bin euer Herrf', which reads like a literal translation of the Vulgate, rather than Luther's rendering of the propbet's words.
Vl.
Through conflict regulation and integration, people in the Middle Ages developed social structures wbich enabled them to rely on one another. This kind of reliance, however, was not necessarily understood as 'trust' is today.
'Trust' can be seen as a specific combination of cultural practices, of emotional and rational phenomena, and of specific ideas and values connected with these practices and phenomena. Theories of trust might serve as a tool to become aware of the human ability to cooperate. But a history of trust should investi gate these matters from more than one perspective and with a consideration of more than just one term, 'nust'. Such a history should show how this cultural idea came into being, how and why trust discourses helped to shape the identity of the modern world, and why the tean denotes -and by that identifies -mat ters as different as loyalty, cooperation, security and courage, to name just a few things. A history of trust should explain why, despite important changes and diversity, and despite its ideological and strategic use and misuse, trust managed to obscure its history to such an extent that it now seems a natural phenomenon .
• S See supra, n. 30. Fig. I A current example of the strategic use of ' trust'.
